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PDF FormatArafat also had a keen sense of the importance of education and propaganda, and ensured that these areas would be run by longtime loyalists. Yasser Amer, the PLO Executive Committee member responsible for the organization’s Education Department, became minister of education, while Yasser Abed Rabbo, the Executive Committee member who headed the PLO’s Information and Culture Department, became minister of culture, arts, and information.32
Arafat selected those Fatah leaders in the territories who had proven to be least independent over the years. Thus, he chose Freih Abu Medein, who had been elected on the Fatah slate to head the Arab Lawyers’ Association in Gaza, as justice minister; Zakariyya al-Agha, who had headed the Physicians’ Association in Gaza, became minister of housing; and Saeb Erekat, the member of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid conference who had been most outspokenly supportive of the PLO, was made minister of municipal government affairs, with responsibility for preparing elections as well.33
Having filled the PA’s highest-ranking body with loyalists, Arafat took a further precaution by making it directly subordinate to him. He declared repeatedly that the PA was a branch of the PLO and demanded that PA members defer to him in his capacity as PLO chairman.34 After appointing the PA’s members in June 1994, while he was still in Tunis, he would not allow them to take office until he had arrived in Gaza in early July—at which point he personally swore in each of them.
More importantly, Arafat did not allow PA members to exercise collective responsibility for legislation or governmental policymaking, as they would have were they a genuine cabinet. The PA met weekly, but Arafat robbed these sessions of any pretense of decision-making authority by inviting PLO officials and other prominent Palestinians to attend, declaiming his own opinions at great length, and refusing to hold votes on any issues: At one typical session shortly after the PA was established, Arafat spoke for four and a half hours, allowed the other participants to divide up half an hour of speaking time among them, and ended the meeting without bringing up any proposals for decision.35
In lawmaking, too, Arafat treated himself rather than his PA “cabinet” as the highest authority. The clearest symbol of his dominance was that all eighteen laws promulgated by the PA from its establishment in May 1994 until elections in January 1996 were issued in his name, and almost entirely at his initiative. According to the preambles to these laws, Arafat enacted the first three after consulting with the relevant minister, the next four on his own, and ten of the final eleven after receiving the approval of the PA cabinet.36 In reality, however, the consultations and approvals were a mere formality, if they even took place at all.37 Similarly, Arafat made and promulgated hundreds of government decisions, many of which were laws in all but name; their texts indicated that he rarely bothered even to consult with the relevant minister, let alone the cabinet.
Indeed, despite the facade that individual ministers were responsible for their own areas, Arafat was effectively the minister of all the ministries. His role was particularly pronounced regarding the PA budget, and the three PLO officials holding economics portfolios were not authorized to make any decisions without his approval.38
Arafat’s role as sole decision-maker came through most strikingly in the making of appointments, as he turned the apparatus of government into a patronage machine aimed at serving his political needs. At its base were the Civil Administration workers whom the PA had inherited from Israel: Since they were capable of ensuring the continuation of vital functions such as schools and sanitation, their employment was necessary to cover up the non-performance of the political appointees.39 On top of this core, Arafat gave managerial positions to hundreds of his supporters; according to one account, 830 directors general were appointed to various government ministries and offices by February 1995, one for every nineteen workers.40 Arafat published all the appointments in his own name, regardless of which ministry the appointee was to serve in.41 Since the principal criterion for attaining an office was loyalty to the PLO leader, there was little need to consult with the relevant ministers, or even to inform them; in one case, the minister of health learned that a new deputy had been appointed to his ministry only when he read about it in a newspaper.42 In fact, it was precisely through such appointments that Arafat was able to run all the ministries, regardless of the views of their titular heads.
Most of the high-level appointees were from the PLO-Tunis: Israel gave Arafat clearance to bring in 2,000 PLO officials, and those who were not given positions in the security establishment were integrated into the bureaucracy.43 In addition, thousands of lower-level job-seekers were added to the payroll, often as clerks and secretaries for the political appointees. Within several months of Arafat’s taking power in Gaza and Jericho, the civil service payroll swelled by a few thousand, and it climbed further in the fall of 1994, when “early empowerment” gave the PA responsibility for handling five spheres of authority in the West Bank, including education and health care. By February 1995, the PA had 16,000 workers in its growing bureaucracy, and by year’s end the payroll had reached 28,000.44
Despite the proliferation of employees, Arafat still made most decisions himself, down to the tiniest details. To take but one example, senior PA officials needing small sums of money to travel to neighboring Jordan could not get the disbursement without Arafat’s signature.45 As one public figure in Gaza explained in August 1994, one month after Arafat’s arrival:
Arafat selected those Fatah leaders in the territories who had proven to be least independent over the years. Thus, he chose Freih Abu Medein, who had been elected on the Fatah slate to head the Arab Lawyers’ Association in Gaza, as justice minister; Zakariyya al-Agha, who had headed the Physicians’ Association in Gaza, became minister of housing; and Saeb Erekat, the member of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid conference who had been most outspokenly supportive of the PLO, was made minister of municipal government affairs, with responsibility for preparing elections as well.33
Having filled the PA’s highest-ranking body with loyalists, Arafat took a further precaution by making it directly subordinate to him. He declared repeatedly that the PA was a branch of the PLO and demanded that PA members defer to him in his capacity as PLO chairman.34 After appointing the PA’s members in June 1994, while he was still in Tunis, he would not allow them to take office until he had arrived in Gaza in early July—at which point he personally swore in each of them.
More importantly, Arafat did not allow PA members to exercise collective responsibility for legislation or governmental policymaking, as they would have were they a genuine cabinet. The PA met weekly, but Arafat robbed these sessions of any pretense of decision-making authority by inviting PLO officials and other prominent Palestinians to attend, declaiming his own opinions at great length, and refusing to hold votes on any issues: At one typical session shortly after the PA was established, Arafat spoke for four and a half hours, allowed the other participants to divide up half an hour of speaking time among them, and ended the meeting without bringing up any proposals for decision.35
In lawmaking, too, Arafat treated himself rather than his PA “cabinet” as the highest authority. The clearest symbol of his dominance was that all eighteen laws promulgated by the PA from its establishment in May 1994 until elections in January 1996 were issued in his name, and almost entirely at his initiative. According to the preambles to these laws, Arafat enacted the first three after consulting with the relevant minister, the next four on his own, and ten of the final eleven after receiving the approval of the PA cabinet.36 In reality, however, the consultations and approvals were a mere formality, if they even took place at all.37 Similarly, Arafat made and promulgated hundreds of government decisions, many of which were laws in all but name; their texts indicated that he rarely bothered even to consult with the relevant minister, let alone the cabinet.
Indeed, despite the facade that individual ministers were responsible for their own areas, Arafat was effectively the minister of all the ministries. His role was particularly pronounced regarding the PA budget, and the three PLO officials holding economics portfolios were not authorized to make any decisions without his approval.38
Arafat’s role as sole decision-maker came through most strikingly in the making of appointments, as he turned the apparatus of government into a patronage machine aimed at serving his political needs. At its base were the Civil Administration workers whom the PA had inherited from Israel: Since they were capable of ensuring the continuation of vital functions such as schools and sanitation, their employment was necessary to cover up the non-performance of the political appointees.39 On top of this core, Arafat gave managerial positions to hundreds of his supporters; according to one account, 830 directors general were appointed to various government ministries and offices by February 1995, one for every nineteen workers.40 Arafat published all the appointments in his own name, regardless of which ministry the appointee was to serve in.41 Since the principal criterion for attaining an office was loyalty to the PLO leader, there was little need to consult with the relevant ministers, or even to inform them; in one case, the minister of health learned that a new deputy had been appointed to his ministry only when he read about it in a newspaper.42 In fact, it was precisely through such appointments that Arafat was able to run all the ministries, regardless of the views of their titular heads.
Most of the high-level appointees were from the PLO-Tunis: Israel gave Arafat clearance to bring in 2,000 PLO officials, and those who were not given positions in the security establishment were integrated into the bureaucracy.43 In addition, thousands of lower-level job-seekers were added to the payroll, often as clerks and secretaries for the political appointees. Within several months of Arafat’s taking power in Gaza and Jericho, the civil service payroll swelled by a few thousand, and it climbed further in the fall of 1994, when “early empowerment” gave the PA responsibility for handling five spheres of authority in the West Bank, including education and health care. By February 1995, the PA had 16,000 workers in its growing bureaucracy, and by year’s end the payroll had reached 28,000.44
Despite the proliferation of employees, Arafat still made most decisions himself, down to the tiniest details. To take but one example, senior PA officials needing small sums of money to travel to neighboring Jordan could not get the disbursement without Arafat’s signature.45 As one public figure in Gaza explained in August 1994, one month after Arafat’s arrival:
There is no mechanism that functions in Gaza as it should. One person holds all the authority, and he sticks his nose into each and every detail.... Anybody who needs to install a telephone needs his signature. Anyone who wants to set up a company or further a particular interest has to have Arafat’s approval.46
Under these conditions, corruption flourished, fueled not only by run-of-the-mill venality but also by a systemic political motivation: Bolstering loyalty to the man who stood atop the PA hierarchy. The Palestinian Authority awarded Arafat’s supporters concessions of various sorts, of which the most notorious were monopoly rights for the production and sale of basic goods like cement and gasoline. Various enterprises sprang up, half-governmental and half-private, which took advantage of the profits that could be made as monopolies, and in exchange gave a hefty percentage of their returns to Arafat and his cronies. By the same token, anyone who was not intimately linked to the higher echelons of Arafat’s government was doomed to failure in the steeply sloped field of economic competition, and thus the private sector—which typically provides resources for potential challengers to an authoritarian regime—shriveled in direct proportion to the bloating of the PA.
Local government also has the potential to serve as a countervailing power to a strong central authority, but not in the case of the PA: Instead, Arafat turned regional and municipal government into an extension of his regime. With the assistance of Saeb Erekat, Arafat appointed the municipal councils and council heads, seeking in most cases to ensure dominance by Fatah loyalists alongside token representation of other groups.47 PA control over municipal councils did not end with their appointment, however. Military officers were assigned to “assist” council heads in running the affairs of their towns, often under the supervision of a regional governor who was himself a military figure reporting directly to Arafat. In Jericho, for example, a military officer took over the real responsibility for running the municipality, which ultimately resulted in the resignation of the civilian mayor.48 In the Jenin region, Arafat appointed as governor Hikmat Zeid al-Kilani, who had been deported from the territories years earlier.49 Various PA offices sought to run the municipalities’ affairs, as the Ministry of Local Government carried out building and development projects with only minimal involvement by the municipal councils. The Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), set up by the PA to channel international aid, also handled many municipal projects directly. Municipalities that balked at this arrangement were faced with a cutoff of funds, including money earmarked for their projects by international donors.50
In sum, Arafat alone possessed all the governmental powers that in a democracy would be distributed among a number of bodies and shared by numerous individuals: The authority to legislate, to make and promulgate administrative decisions in all fields, to allocate the budget, to regulate businesses, to make governmental appointments, and to control projects down to the municipal level. During the twenty months before elections were held, Arafat was able to use these resources to increase support for himself and his loyalists. By giving prominent posts to his backers, and especially to senior officials of the PLO-Tunis, Arafat gave them a leg up in contesting seats in the Council elections; by denying such positions to independent-minded local leaders, he was able to undercut their public support. Moreover, control of the resources at the PA’s disposal enabled Arafat to do favors for tens of thousands of people during the year and a half before election day, with the clear expectation that these debts would be repaid at the ballot box. The civil service, which made up a substantial percentage of the work force in the territories, was especially critical in this regard, as employees and their family members were given a powerful incentive to advance candidates backed by the government that was providing their livelihood.
Local government also has the potential to serve as a countervailing power to a strong central authority, but not in the case of the PA: Instead, Arafat turned regional and municipal government into an extension of his regime. With the assistance of Saeb Erekat, Arafat appointed the municipal councils and council heads, seeking in most cases to ensure dominance by Fatah loyalists alongside token representation of other groups.47 PA control over municipal councils did not end with their appointment, however. Military officers were assigned to “assist” council heads in running the affairs of their towns, often under the supervision of a regional governor who was himself a military figure reporting directly to Arafat. In Jericho, for example, a military officer took over the real responsibility for running the municipality, which ultimately resulted in the resignation of the civilian mayor.48 In the Jenin region, Arafat appointed as governor Hikmat Zeid al-Kilani, who had been deported from the territories years earlier.49 Various PA offices sought to run the municipalities’ affairs, as the Ministry of Local Government carried out building and development projects with only minimal involvement by the municipal councils. The Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), set up by the PA to channel international aid, also handled many municipal projects directly. Municipalities that balked at this arrangement were faced with a cutoff of funds, including money earmarked for their projects by international donors.50
In sum, Arafat alone possessed all the governmental powers that in a democracy would be distributed among a number of bodies and shared by numerous individuals: The authority to legislate, to make and promulgate administrative decisions in all fields, to allocate the budget, to regulate businesses, to make governmental appointments, and to control projects down to the municipal level. During the twenty months before elections were held, Arafat was able to use these resources to increase support for himself and his loyalists. By giving prominent posts to his backers, and especially to senior officials of the PLO-Tunis, Arafat gave them a leg up in contesting seats in the Council elections; by denying such positions to independent-minded local leaders, he was able to undercut their public support. Moreover, control of the resources at the PA’s disposal enabled Arafat to do favors for tens of thousands of people during the year and a half before election day, with the clear expectation that these debts would be repaid at the ballot box. The civil service, which made up a substantial percentage of the work force in the territories, was especially critical in this regard, as employees and their family members were given a powerful incentive to advance candidates backed by the government that was providing their livelihood.
IV
Though Arafat had clear control over the police force and the executive branch, the political advantages of this power could in theory have been limited if he were forced to submit to the rule of law. Laws, by their nature, apply equally to all citizens, and judges, by profession, are supposed to mete out justice without discrimination: But a would-be dictator is constantly in need of ways to advance the interests of those who will support him and weaken or punish his potential opponents. Understanding this all too well, Arafat made every effort to undermine the rule of law and to create a subservient judiciary. Indeed, it would be fair to say that institutionalized lawlessness was the third pillar of his Gaza-Jericho regime, and a crucial element in his overall efforts to create an election-proof dictatorship.
