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PDF FormatThe public debate in the United States surrounding the future of Bush’s plans currently oscillates between two approaches. According to the first, the administration plays up false or temporary accomplishments and insists that the Middle East’s road to democratization is being paved-even if it does still remain a long one. The second, espoused by the war’s opponents, calls for an immediate withdrawal of Western armies from Iraq and the abandonment of all aspirations to “impose” foreign regimes and worldviews on the Arab world. Adherence to either of these views is likely to lead to the same result: The defeat of the Western project in Iraq, the repeal of hopes for liberalism in the Arab world, and a serious erosion of America’s strategic and moral standing in both the Middle East and the world at large.
Clearly, the United States must adopt a new doctrine, one that attempts to sever the connection in the Arab mind between democracy and the promotion of Western power. First, this doctrine must acknowledge the necessity of maintaining American forces on Iraqi soil, since a hasty withdrawal is liable to tip an already unstable situation toward wide-scale anarchy. Moreover, such a move will certainly be interpreted in the Arab world as proof not only of the West’s weakness, but also of the weakness of liberalism itself. Second, this doctrine should incorporate two new principles into its previously stated commitment to Iraq: One, a reduction in the contingency between potential outcomes of the democratization process in Arab societies and the condition of the American economy; and two, the universality of American standards in the field of human rights. Whereas the first principle will afford the United States more room for political maneuvering-and, in time, rid it of the suspicion prevalent in the Arab world that its true goals are imperialistic-the second principle will lend its foreign policy the credibility it currently lacks and help those Arab liberals who oppose their regime obtain the legitimacy denied to them today. Indeed, one of the main difficulties that today’s Arab freedom fighters face is the suspicion that they are lackeys of the West. So long as America continues to discriminate between liberals, advocates of the pan-Arab idea, and Islamist activists, then democratic leaders like Riyadh Seif in Syria, whose commitment to liberalism has withstood over four years of incarceration, will not gain the support of his own people.
The new doctrine will have to address the political problems related to the oil economy. American dependency on Arab oil must be reduced, and this reduction must be linked to the question of democratization. Today the United States has no exculpatory answer to the accusation that its true interest is ensuring the continued supply of oil from the Persian Gulf, and nurtures regimes that prove accommodating on this point. The United States ignores human-rights violations in the Gulf emirates while reproaching Syria for similar violations in its territory. It warns Damascus of the consequences of its involvement in terrorism, but tiptoes around the proven connection between the Wahhabi establishment and the insurgency in Iraq. So long as the West depends so heavily on Middle East oil, there will be no easy answer to the charge that America’s only priority in the region is advancing its economic interests.
Another issue the new doctrine must address is the Arab belief that democracy promotion is an excuse by the United States to remove from power rulers who are not to its liking and replace them with ones who are. In truth, this accusation cannot be dismissed as pure propaganda, since the administration went to war against Iraqi tyranny but contented itself with generalized declarations in favor of reform in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. “What is the moral difference between Baghdad and Riyadh?” Arab intellectuals ask. When they do not receive a reasonable answer, they doubt the sincerity of the democratization initiative as a whole.
America must therefore set consistent standards for the implementation of diplomatic and commercial sanctions on Arab regimes guilty of human rights violations. Consistent standards will have the double effect of forcing Arab regimes to ease their grip on society while convincing these regimes’ opponents that they are not alone in their struggle for reform.
Of course, the United States cannot be expected to act indiscriminately against every Arab country whose progress toward democracy is unsatisfactory. American foreign policy cannot afford to neglect its immediate interests and other commitments, among them its commitment to the welfare of Israel. In the context of its new doctrine, however, the administration will be required to clarify why certain undemocratic Arab regimes receive preferential treatment. It could point to realistic considerations about the limitations of its power, for example, or the fact that it is easier to influence in friendly ways regimes that are not openly hostile. In any event, America can no longer make do with prettified explanations for its behavior.
The universalization of standards in the field of human rights will force the United States to be more evenhanded in its attitude toward alleged processes of reforms, the real purpose of which is to prevent the possibility of democratization. In the past decade and a half, many Arab regimes sympathetic to the United States announced reforms viewed by Westerners as historical revolutions. In reality, such regimes were merely paying lip service to American demands, offering empty gestures that only reinforced the rulers’ political power. The case of Bahrain is a typical example: Hamad Al Khalifa, the emirate’s relatively young, Western-educated king, introduced upon his ascendance to the throne in 1999 a series of reforms that amended the constitution, revitalized parliament, and guaranteed individual liberties. Bahrainis were promised “a new dawn of democracy,” and the West was only too eager to offer praise. Yet in the end, the king’s authority over the entire system of government, including parliament, remained unrestricted, and the promise of democratic progress never materialized.26 Time after time, American administrations were hoodwinked by empty reforms: Parliaments with no real authority to legislate; constitutions whose stated protection of freedom of speech is nothing but a slogan; television stations that may discuss every taboo, but never mention the royal family’s name. Not surprisingly, the United States became a laughingstock to those who supported real reform in the Arab world.
By far the most crucial adjustment the new doctrine must make, however, is the unequivocal public acknowledgment of the possibility that free elections may bring to power forces antagonistic to the West. Without such an acknowledgment, the Arab world will never take the American democratization initiative at face value. Referring to the war in Iraq, many Arab intellectuals have expressed the concern that if the United States has to choose between a tyranny led by a pro-Western leader or an Islamic democracy, it will choose the former. This view is based, for example, on events in Algeria in the early 1990s: The Algerian government cancelled the parliamentary elections in which a victory by the militant Islamic Salvation Front was imminent, with tacit American approval.
Were most Arab countries to hold free elections, Islamist parties would consistently win the majority of votes. This is the expected outcome in both Egypt and Jordan, should free elections be held, and in Syria the Muslim Brotherhood would almost certainly become the largest party, even if it did not win an absolute majority.
The reason for Arab society’s widespread sympathy for Islamic movements is connected to religious radicalization in Arab society, but only partly. Equally important is the fact that Islamic movements are often the most organized, and are adept at homing in on the feelings of a public that is exasperated with the existing order. At the same time, they act as a conservative-purist option, standing for family values, community strength, and national honor; as a social option that promises to help the weak; as a “clean” option that swears to root out corruption and nepotism; and as a xenophobic option that attracts those who feel humiliated by their low social position. While it is true that many opposition movements in the West sell themselves on similar platforms, it is rare for any one political party to appeal to so many elements of society as do the Islamic movements in the Arab world.
The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest and most powerful of the Islamic movements, is actually in favor of free elections and the establishment of a parliament. Yet the democracy envisioned by the Muslim Brotherhood is far from liberal; in its view, an assembly of elected representatives cannot act outside the rules set by Allah, and their sole duty is to interpret his behest. Sovereignty, according to this form of “democracy,” is not in the hands of the people, but in Allah’s hands, and party-political activity is condemned as divisive. This is a classic example of conditional democracy: The Muslim Brotherhood is willing to participate in democratic elections in order to win, but once victorious will not hesitate to dismantle the system that brought it to power.27
Of course, the West cannot treat the possibility of negative outcomes casually. Rather, it must weigh the probability of success against the risk and may also take comfort in the fact that Islamic movements will not participate in a democratization process that takes place in a vacuum. If the doctrine proposed here is implemented, once these Islamic movements have come to power, they will confront a Western policy that does not tolerate the violation of human rights and enjoys an increasing amount of Arab and international legitimacy. At the same time, these Islamic movements will have to cope with local political opponents who enjoy a growing popularity in their communities. Of course, there will be those Islamic movements, in spite of internal resistance and international sanctions, that manage to use the democratic process in order to undermine it. However, there is also the possibility that in some Arab countries, Islamic movements will take part in pluralistic political campaigns, represent the most conservative position, and halfheartedly reconcile themselves to legislation that is not to their liking. Both outcomes are likely, and one does not exclude the other. Indeed, democratic reform in the Middle East will not be considered trustworthy if it gives rise solely to pro-Western leaders.
Another issue the new doctrine must address is the Arab belief that democracy promotion is an excuse by the United States to remove from power rulers who are not to its liking and replace them with ones who are. In truth, this accusation cannot be dismissed as pure propaganda, since the administration went to war against Iraqi tyranny but contented itself with generalized declarations in favor of reform in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. “What is the moral difference between Baghdad and Riyadh?” Arab intellectuals ask. When they do not receive a reasonable answer, they doubt the sincerity of the democratization initiative as a whole.
America must therefore set consistent standards for the implementation of diplomatic and commercial sanctions on Arab regimes guilty of human rights violations. Consistent standards will have the double effect of forcing Arab regimes to ease their grip on society while convincing these regimes’ opponents that they are not alone in their struggle for reform.
Of course, the United States cannot be expected to act indiscriminately against every Arab country whose progress toward democracy is unsatisfactory. American foreign policy cannot afford to neglect its immediate interests and other commitments, among them its commitment to the welfare of Israel. In the context of its new doctrine, however, the administration will be required to clarify why certain undemocratic Arab regimes receive preferential treatment. It could point to realistic considerations about the limitations of its power, for example, or the fact that it is easier to influence in friendly ways regimes that are not openly hostile. In any event, America can no longer make do with prettified explanations for its behavior.
The universalization of standards in the field of human rights will force the United States to be more evenhanded in its attitude toward alleged processes of reforms, the real purpose of which is to prevent the possibility of democratization. In the past decade and a half, many Arab regimes sympathetic to the United States announced reforms viewed by Westerners as historical revolutions. In reality, such regimes were merely paying lip service to American demands, offering empty gestures that only reinforced the rulers’ political power. The case of Bahrain is a typical example: Hamad Al Khalifa, the emirate’s relatively young, Western-educated king, introduced upon his ascendance to the throne in 1999 a series of reforms that amended the constitution, revitalized parliament, and guaranteed individual liberties. Bahrainis were promised “a new dawn of democracy,” and the West was only too eager to offer praise. Yet in the end, the king’s authority over the entire system of government, including parliament, remained unrestricted, and the promise of democratic progress never materialized.26 Time after time, American administrations were hoodwinked by empty reforms: Parliaments with no real authority to legislate; constitutions whose stated protection of freedom of speech is nothing but a slogan; television stations that may discuss every taboo, but never mention the royal family’s name. Not surprisingly, the United States became a laughingstock to those who supported real reform in the Arab world.
By far the most crucial adjustment the new doctrine must make, however, is the unequivocal public acknowledgment of the possibility that free elections may bring to power forces antagonistic to the West. Without such an acknowledgment, the Arab world will never take the American democratization initiative at face value. Referring to the war in Iraq, many Arab intellectuals have expressed the concern that if the United States has to choose between a tyranny led by a pro-Western leader or an Islamic democracy, it will choose the former. This view is based, for example, on events in Algeria in the early 1990s: The Algerian government cancelled the parliamentary elections in which a victory by the militant Islamic Salvation Front was imminent, with tacit American approval.
Were most Arab countries to hold free elections, Islamist parties would consistently win the majority of votes. This is the expected outcome in both Egypt and Jordan, should free elections be held, and in Syria the Muslim Brotherhood would almost certainly become the largest party, even if it did not win an absolute majority.
The reason for Arab society’s widespread sympathy for Islamic movements is connected to religious radicalization in Arab society, but only partly. Equally important is the fact that Islamic movements are often the most organized, and are adept at homing in on the feelings of a public that is exasperated with the existing order. At the same time, they act as a conservative-purist option, standing for family values, community strength, and national honor; as a social option that promises to help the weak; as a “clean” option that swears to root out corruption and nepotism; and as a xenophobic option that attracts those who feel humiliated by their low social position. While it is true that many opposition movements in the West sell themselves on similar platforms, it is rare for any one political party to appeal to so many elements of society as do the Islamic movements in the Arab world.
The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest and most powerful of the Islamic movements, is actually in favor of free elections and the establishment of a parliament. Yet the democracy envisioned by the Muslim Brotherhood is far from liberal; in its view, an assembly of elected representatives cannot act outside the rules set by Allah, and their sole duty is to interpret his behest. Sovereignty, according to this form of “democracy,” is not in the hands of the people, but in Allah’s hands, and party-political activity is condemned as divisive. This is a classic example of conditional democracy: The Muslim Brotherhood is willing to participate in democratic elections in order to win, but once victorious will not hesitate to dismantle the system that brought it to power.27
Of course, the West cannot treat the possibility of negative outcomes casually. Rather, it must weigh the probability of success against the risk and may also take comfort in the fact that Islamic movements will not participate in a democratization process that takes place in a vacuum. If the doctrine proposed here is implemented, once these Islamic movements have come to power, they will confront a Western policy that does not tolerate the violation of human rights and enjoys an increasing amount of Arab and international legitimacy. At the same time, these Islamic movements will have to cope with local political opponents who enjoy a growing popularity in their communities. Of course, there will be those Islamic movements, in spite of internal resistance and international sanctions, that manage to use the democratic process in order to undermine it. However, there is also the possibility that in some Arab countries, Islamic movements will take part in pluralistic political campaigns, represent the most conservative position, and halfheartedly reconcile themselves to legislation that is not to their liking. Both outcomes are likely, and one does not exclude the other. Indeed, democratic reform in the Middle East will not be considered trustworthy if it gives rise solely to pro-Western leaders.
