Why should Israel continue to act as a Zionist state? The answer is simple: Because it has not yet fulfilled its purpose. The State of Israel was established in order to solve the problems of Jewish existence, and these problems have not yet been solved. A portion of the Jewish people (in the Soviet Union, in the Communist bloc, and in the Arab countries) lives under the threat of persecution, if not annihilation. Another portion (in the Western countries) faces the danger of assimilation and the cessation of its unique cultural creativity. Our people as a whole stands at risk of dissolution into independent centers of Jewish life. The State of Israel alone can save the communities that live in fear of physical destruction, and it alone can focus the loyalty of Jews tempted by assimilation. And Israel’s ability to address the problems of Jewish existence depends on its continuing its Zionist policy. If aliya were to cease and the organizational, economic, and cultural ties between Israel and the diaspora were to unravel, Israel would no longer have any role to play in the life of the Jewish people, and, from this perspective at least, it would be as though it had never been.

Are Israel and its citizens responsible for the entire Jewish people? Absolutely. First, because Israel was not established solely through the efforts of those who lived in Palestine. Generations of Jews from around the world put their bodies and souls into it. When they understood that it was a solution to the problems of their entire beleaguered people, they pooled the resources of all segments of world Jewry in order to build it. If the state were to deny its overarching national commitment, it would mean no less than a betrayal of the Jewish people’s deepest trust. Second, Israel exists for the sole purpose of taking responsibility for the entire people, and only this justifies both its ongoing support for the diaspora and the very presence of a Jewish population in the land of Israel. It is commonly argued that the past does not obligate people in the present. But the pioneers who immigrated from the diaspora and built their homes in the land of Israel came in order to solve the problems of the Jewish people. In the meantime, they gave birth to children, whose right to dwell here is a function of their having been born here. This is their natural homeland, and since they differ both from the Arabs and from the Jews of the diaspora, they are entitled to the political rights of a separate “national entity.” This is, on the face of it, a reasonable argument.

But beyond the obvious problem with this argument, that the population of Israel far more resembles an “ingathering of exiles” than an indigenous people, we must also take a closer look at the nature of this Israeli “national entity.”  On what can it base its desire to distinguish itself from its surroundings? How can it justify itself against the Palestinian Arabs’ claim that they have a prior national right to this land, that it is their homeland? Only two responses are possible. One is that the uniqueness of Israeli nationhood lies in its higher European culture. This answer, however, only confirms the claim that Israel is a foreign European “colony,” the last child of Western imperialism, and that its existence is therefore a crying injustice against the Arabs of the country. A second is that Israel’s uniqueness resides in its own particular culture, whose source is the linguistic, literary, historical, and philosophical heritage of Judaism. However, one who stakes Israel’s independence on Jewish uniqueness forfeits his right to decline responsibility for the people as a whole. That is to say, any accession to the frequently made demand of moderate Arab leaders, that the bond between the Jewish state and the Jewish people be dissolved, would then justify the Arabs’ argument that Israel is nothing more than a bridgehead for Western colonialism.

Finally, commitment to the Jewish people is something that follows from the Israeli Jew’s obligation to be true to himself. For by denying his people, he rejects his national identity, and corrupts all his cultural and moral associations. I do not mean to suggest that such a denial is impossible. With hindsight, we can identify a process of assimilation that the Jewish community in the land of Israel underwent, and is still undergoing, no less than its brethren in the diaspora, although in a different way and with different results. The minority that advocates abandoning Zionist policy is, in effect, an expression of this process, the true extent of which is greater than it seems. Nevertheless, “Israeli” assimilation means nothing less than giving up on the existence of the stateׁif not immediately, then in the not-too-distant future.

Thus, the tables are turned: Israel must undertake a Zionist policy not only for the sake of the Jewish people, but for its own sake as well. Otherwise, it will sooner or later come to an end, if not by military destruction, then by economic, social, and cultural degeneration. It is no exaggeration to say that the choice between a Zionist policy and its rejection is the choice between the existence of Israel and its ruin. As we noted, national destruction is always a path that can be chosen. And one who chooses such a path is still better off knowing where he is going.

How would Israel’s renunciation of Zionism lead to its destruction? In the absence of any justification for its existence, the country would lose its moral resistance against external pressures. But moral strength is the basis of physical strength. Israel did not come into the world and endure till now without understanding the importance of its own existence, the urgency of its mission, and the justness of its goals. Israel cannot go on, not even for a short time, if its citizens lack this moral certitude.

Those who propose that Israel sever its ties with the diaspora assume that in return for this concession, the Arabs will make peace. They also assume that at that point Israel will no longer need a connection to the Jewish people. These assumptions are questionable, at the very least on a pragmatic level. The Arab leaders believe in the Jewish uniqueness of the State of Israel more than do those Israelis who are anti-Zionists. And they will not be willing to come to terms with it, even in exchange for Israel’s renunciation of Zionism. The most they are willing to do is bide their time, waiting for Israel to fall. But even without military intervention by its enemies, Israel will not last long without a connection to the Jewish people as a whole. It will deteriorate rapidly and in the end disintegrate.

In theory, of course, we could imagine Israel preserving its unique character as an island of developed Western culture, and its achievements might even have an impact on its neighbors. In theory, it could also be imagined that the Israeli population would fend off the demographic competition solely through its inner fortitude.

But it takes no small amount of delusion to rely on these theories. Israel’s connections with the West, both political and cultural, derive from its special ties with Jews who are tapped into the major centers of Western culture. With these bonds broken, the West would no longer have any interest in taking a tiny Middle Eastern country under its wing. On the contrary, the best scientific minds that had come together in Israel would be drawn away to the research centers of America and Europe. First, the country would become a spiritual ghetto; afterwards it would drop sharply to the cultural level of its surroundings. There is no reason to believe that under these conditions the Israeli population could withstand the demographic competition that it would necessarily face. The Arab majority would inundate it, first culturally, then politically. This is not idle speculation. Certain events in Israeli society in the years between the War of Independence and the Six Day War provide corroborative evidence. Native-born Israelis, who presumably regarded the country as their “natural homeland,” had no great difficulty leaving it in search of success on distant continents. The demographic pressure increased, and the danger that the Jewish state would gradually become part of the Levant was palpable. Only the renewed Zionist consciousness among Israeli Jews after the Six Day War stemmed the tide.

The choice, therefore, is not between developing and intensifying Israel’s Jewish character, or keeping Israel stable and content with what it has already achieved. Rather, it is between immigration and development on the one hand, and emigration and decay on the other. The moderate Arab leaders and the moderate opponents of Zionism in the West understand this. They envision the destruction of Israel by peaceful means. If the Arabs were to accept the existence of Israel once it has renounced Zionism, this would be a wise tactic. Before long, emigration would render Israel too weak to oppose the demographic domination of the Arabs, and in the end Israel would disappear. Through peaceful means, the Arabs would achieve what they had not managed to attain by strength of arms.

In conclusion, we must understand that Israel is a voluntary undertaking, an enterprise of the will, and it can continue to exist only as such. Impersonal forces of nature will not sustain it. If we want it, we must choose to develop it; and if we want to develop it, we must accept its unique Zionist mission: To be the state of the entire Jewish people.