The USS Liberty was decommissioned in 1968 and later sold for scrap. That same year, William McGonagle received the Congressional Medal of Honor for gallantry displayed during the attack, and Israel paid over $6 million in restitution to the families of those wounded and killed. An additional $6 million in damages was paid under a 1980 agreement in which Israel and the United States consented “not to address the issue or motive or reopen the case for any reason.”⁵¹ But the case remained open nonetheless. While the controversy surrounding similar incidents would subside—the Iraqi missile attack on the USS Stark in 1987 and the downing of an Iranian jetliner by the USS Vincennes in 1988 come to mind—the bitterness over the Liberty incident endured. The release of hitherto classified papers on the incident, however, now enables us to dispel spurious theories about the incident, and to conclude that Israel’s assault upon the USS Liberty was a tragic error, and nothing more. In light of the new documents, it is now possible to reconstruct the chain of mishaps on the part of both sides that led to the unintended Israeli attack.

The incident began with the ill-conceived decision to send the Liberty to the crisis-torn Middle East, a mere half-mile beyond Egyptian waters, in an area not used by commercial shipping and which Nasser had declared off-limits to neutral vessels. The Americans did not accede to Chief of Staff Rabin’s request for the identification of all U.S. ships in the area or Ambassador Harman’s request for a strategic liaison between Israel and the Sixth Fleet. The Liberty’s dispatchers, meanwhile, overrode naval orders to keep the ship in Spain, and then failed to inform the U.S. attaché in Tel Aviv of its presence near the war zone. These mistakes were compounded by the navy’s communications system, which delayed by as much as two days orders to the Liberty to withdraw 100 miles from the coast.⁵² Even after it was hit, the Americans had difficulty locating the Liberty, the JCS placing it at “60-100 miles north of Egypt.” If neither Castle, nor CINCEUR, nor even the President of the United States could know where the Liberty was, it seems unreasonable to expect that the Israelis, in the thick of battle, should have been able to locate it.

The Israelis, too, committed their own share of fateful errors, as the Yerushalmi report points out: The erroneous reports of bombardment at El-Arish, the failure to replace the Liberty’s marker on the board after it had been cleared, the over-eagerness of naval commanders, and worst of all, Ensign Yifrah’s miscalculation of the ship’s speed. Though Yerushalmi’s report suggested reasons for these errors—inflexible naval procedures, the inaccuracy of speed-measuring devices—one is still left with a sense of poor organization and sloppy execution. Moreover, there were breakdowns in communications between the Israeli navy and air force stemming from inadequate command structure and the immense pressures of a multi-front war. To these factors must be added Israel’s general sensitivity about its coastal defenses, and the exhaustion of its pilots after four days of uninterrupted combat. Yet none of these amount to the kind of gross negligence of which the Israelis have been accused.

And then there were “bad breaks” that are unfortunately commonplace in war: The U.S. planes that were called back because of their nuclear payload (their mere presence might have warded off the torpedo boats); the Liberty’s inability to signal the approaching Israeli boats, and the machine gunner who fired on them; and the smoke that hid the identities of both the attackers and the attacked.

All of these elements combined to create a tragic “friendly fire” incident of the kind that claimed the lives of at least fifty Israeli soldiers in the Six Day War, and caused 5,373 American casualties in Vietnam in 1967 alone.⁵³ Obviously, these findings can do little to lessen the suffering of those American servicemen who were wounded in the incident, nor can they be expected to offer comfort to the families of the dead. But they should at least permit us to bring to a close what has for a generation remained one of the most painful chapters in the history of America’s relationship with the State of Israel.

Michael B. Oren is Israel’s Ambassador to the United States. He was formerly a Distinguished Fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem, an academic and research institute, and a contributing editor of AZURE.  
 
 

The author wishes to thank Mihal Tzur, Director of the Israel Defense Forces Archive, and Judge A. Jay Cristol for their assistance in researching this article.

1. Thomas H. Moorer’s foreword to James M. Ennes, Jr., Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship (New York: Ivy, 1979), p. ix.

2. Cited in USS Liberty Internet site (www.halcyon.com/jim/ussliberty/liberty.htm).

3. Wisconsin Public Radio station WLFM interview of Dean Rusk by Tom Clark, February 1999, cited in USS Liberty Internet site.

4. Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (hereafter “LBJ”), Oral History of David G. Nes, p. 31.

5. Cited in USS Liberty Internet site.

6. Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days that Changed the Middle East (Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1984).

7. Reverdy S. Fishel, “The Attack on the Liberty: An ‘Accident’?” in International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 3, 1995.

8. June 1992. See also Evans and Novak’s “Remembering the Liberty,” in The Washington Post, November 6, 1991; “The Liberty Quotes,” in The Washington Post, November 11, 1991; Mark Genrich, editorial page column, The Phoenix Gazette, June 5, 1996.

9. ABC’s 20/20, May 21, 1987, and NBC’s The Story Behind the Story, January 27, 1992, cited in A. Jay Cristol, The Liberty Incident, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Miami, 1997, pp. 145-148. Cristol, a federal judge in Miami, is the leading expert on the Liberty incident, having devoted years to its study.

10. Anyone in doubt about the nature of the USS Liberty Internet site can follow its links to any number of rabidly anti-Israel sites, among them Palestinian Geocities and Paul Findley’s Council for the National Interest.

11. LBJ, National Security File, History of the Middle East Crisis, Box 18, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Military Actions—Straits of Tiran, May 24, 1967.

12. LBJ, Box 1-10, The USS Liberty: Department of Defense Press Release, June 8, 1967; Box 19: CINCUSNAVEUR Order, May 30, 1967; Box 18, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Military Actions—Straits of Tiran, May 25, 1967; Box 104/107, The National Military Command Center: Attack on the USS Liberty, June 9, 1967.

13. For a discussion of Israel’s considerations in going to war, see Michael B. Oren, “Did Israel Want the Six Day War?” Azure 7, Spring 1999, pp. 47-86.

14. United States National Archives, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Record Group 59 (hereafter “USNA”), USUN, Box 6: CINSTRIKE to AIG, June 2, 1967. Ben-Gurion Archive, Diary, Entry for May 26, 1967. See also Cristol, Liberty Incident, pp. 25-26.

15. British Public Record Office, FCO17/498, Israel—Political Affairs: Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, June 5, 1967. See also Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Berkeley: University of California, 1996), pp. 100, 110; Hirsh Goodman and Ze’ev Schiff, “The Attack on the Liberty,” The Atlantic Monthly, September 1984, p. 81.

16. LBJ, National Security File, History of the Middle East Crisis, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, pp. 87-88.

17. LBJ, National Security File, History of the Middle East Crisis, Box 19: JCS to USCINCEUR, June 8, 1967; Box 104/107, The National Military Command Center: Attack on the USS Liberty, June 9, 1967; Department of Defense: USS Liberty Incident, June 15, 1967. USNA, Chairman Wheeler Files, Box 27: The Court of Inquiry Findings, June 22, 1967.

18. Israel Defense Forces Archive, 2104/92/47: “Attack on the Liberty,” IDF Historical Department, Research and Instruction Branch, June 1982 (hereafter “IDF, Attack on the Liberty”). The Israeli fighter pilot originally thought that the ship had fired at him, and Israeli destroyers were ordered to find it. The orders were rescinded, however, following further debriefing of the pilot.

19. Israel State Archives (hereafter “ISA”), 4079/26 Foreign Ministry Files, The Liberty Incident; IDF Preliminary Inquiry File 1/67 Col. Y. Yerushalmi (hereafter “ISA, The Yerushalmi Report”). Report by Carl F. Salans, Department of State Legal Advisor, September 21, 1967, to the Under Secretary of State. (Document available on the USS Liberty site.)

20. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report. The Liberty was also sailing near ‘Point Boaz,’ the location at which Israeli aircraft entered and exited Sinai—another reason for the heavy air traffic that morning. See IDF, Attack on the Liberty, p. 39, note 14.

21. Muhammad Fawzi, The Three Years War (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi, 1980), p. 149 [Arabic]; Cristol, Liberty Incident, p. 30.

22. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report. See also Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 108-109.

23. No relation to the author.

24. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Mordechai Hod, March 9, 1999. Ehud Yanay, No Margin for Error: The Making of the Israeli Air Force (New York: Pantheon, 1993), p. 257. Castle’s denial and McGonagle’s confirmation of Bareket’s claim both appear on the USS Liberty site.

25. The Israeli pilot mistook the “G” on the Liberty’s hull for a “C.” IDF, Attack on the Liberty. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report.

26. Rabin, Memoirs, p. 108. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report.

27. LBJ, Country Files, Box 104/107, The National Military Command Center: Attack on the USS Liberty, June 9, 1967. See also Cristol, Liberty Incident, p. 55.

28. IDF, Attack on the Liberty. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report. USNA, Chairman Wheeler Files, Box 27: The Court of Inquiry Findings, June 22, 1967.

29. IDF, Attack on the Liberty. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report.

30. IDF, Attack on the Liberty. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report.

31. IDF, Attack on the Liberty. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report.

32. Rabin, Memoirs, p. 109.

33. USNA, Box 16: “Liberty Hit by Torpedo,” June 8, 1967; “Inventory of Submarines,” June 8, 1967; W. Rostow to the President, June 8, 1967; Box 15: DOS to CINSTRIKE, June 9, 1967. LBJ, Country Files, Box 1-10, The National Military Command Center: Memorandum for the Record of Preliminary Information—USS Liberty Struck by Torpedo, June 8, 1967; Box 104/107, The National Military Command Center: Attack on the USS Liberty, June 9, 1967; History of the Middle East Crisis, Box 19: JCS to USCINCEUR, June 8, 1967.

34. The United States had gone over to daylight savings time, while Israel had not, and the result was a six-hour time difference between Washington and Israel.

35. LBJ, Country Files, Box 104/107, Middle East Crisis: Rostow to the President, June 8, 1967; Note to the President, June 8, 1967; Message to Kosygin, June 8, 1967. See also Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 301-303; Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: Penguin, 1990), p. 388.

36. USNA, Box 16: Diplomatic Activity in Connection with the USS Liberty Incident, June 14, 1967. LBJ, Country Files, Box 104/107, Middle East Crisis: Eshkol to Johnson; Memos to the President (W. Rostow), Box 17: Barbour to Department of State, June 8, 1967. ISA, 4079/26 Foreign Ministry Files, The Liberty Incident: Harman to Foreign Ministry, June 10, 1967; Eban to Johnson, June 9, 1967; Evron to Johnson, June 8, 1967.

37. Upon learning of the attack, the U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Walworth Barbour, warned the State Department that “its [the Liberty’s] proximity to the scene of the conflict could feed Arab suspicions of U.S.-Israeli collusion.” Similarly, Ambassador-Designate Richard H. Nolte in Egypt wrote, “We had better get our story on the torpedoing of USS Liberty out fast and it had better be good.” See LBJ, National Security File, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, pp. 143-144; Box 104/107, Middle East Crisis: Cairo to Department, June 9, 1967.

38. ISA, 4079/26 Foreign Ministry Files, The Liberty Incident, Harman to Foreign Ministry. LBJ, Country Files, Box 104/107, Middle East Crisis: Diplomatic Activity in Connection with the USS Liberty Incident, June 14, 1967. See also Clark Clifford (with Richard Holbrooke), Counsel to the President (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 446-447; Phil G. Goulding, Confirm or Deny: Informing the People on National Security (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 123-130; Cristol, Liberty Incident, pp. 93-94.

39. ISA, 4079/26 The Liberty Incident: Bitan to Harman, June 18, 1967.

40. ISA, 4079/26 The Liberty Incident: Bitan to Harman, June 18, 1967; Evron to Eban (Rostow quote), June 19, 1967. LBJ, National Security File, Country Files, Box 104/107, Middle East Crisis: Rusk to Harman, June 10, 1967.

41. ISA, The Yerushalmi Report. LBJ, National Security File, Country Files, Box 104/107: Middle East Crisis: Diplomatic Activity in Connection with the USS Liberty Incident, June 14, 1967. Though none of the Israeli officers involved in the incident stood trial, Capt. Rahav, who dispatched the torpedo boats and called on the air force to attack the Liberty, was forced to resign his commission. See Shlomo Erell, Facing the Sea: The Story of a Fighting Sailor and Commander (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1998). [Hebrew]

42. USNA, Chairman Wheeler Files, Box 27: The Court of Inquiry Findings, June 22, 1967. LBJ, National Security File, Special Committee, Box 1-10: Why the USS Liberty Was Where It Was. Cristol, Liberty Incident, pp. 86-105. Rusk, As I Saw It, p. 388.

43. See, for example, Anthony Pearson, Conspiracy of Silence: The Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty (London: Quartet Books, 1978).

44. Though Arab archives remain closed, the Six Day (or June) War has yielded numerous memoirs by the civilian and military leaders of Egypt and Jordan. Examples can be found in Mahmud Riad, Mahmud Riad’s Memoirs (Beirut: Al-Muasasah al-’Arabiyya Lil’Dirasat al-Nashr, 1987), vol. 2 [Arabic]; Muhammad Hassanayn Heikal, 1967: The Explosion (Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram, 1990) [Arabic]; Abdel-Latif Al-Baghdadi, Memoirs (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1977) [Arabic]; Abdel Muhsin Kamil Murtagi, Major-General Murtagi Attests to the Truth (Cairo: Dar al-Watan al-Arabi, 1976). [Arabic]

45. The Link, July-August 1997.

46. Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem, p. 253. Further exposition of the theory appears in Richard K. Smith, “The Violation of the Liberty,” in the Institute for Naval Proceedings, June 1978.

47. Thames TV documentary, Attack on the Liberty, cited in Cristol, Liberty Incident, p. 204.

48. LBJ, National Security File, Box 104/107, Middle East Crisis: Jerusalem to the Secretary of State, June 8, 1967; Barbour to Department, June 8, 1967; Joint Embassy Memorandum, June 8, 1967.

49. Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes (New York: Putnam, 1992), p. 423. On Israeli decision making on the Golan, see Hanoch Bartov, Dado: 48 Years and 20 Days (Tel Aviv: Ma’ariv, 1978), pp. 100-102 [Hebrew]; Eitan Haber, Today War Will Break Out (Tel Aviv: Yedi’ot Aharonot, 1987), pp. 244-246 [Hebrew]; Zerah Verhaftig, Fifty Years and One (Jerusalem: Yad Shapira, 1998), pp. 190-191 [Hebrew]; Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 113-116.

50. It is ironic, perhaps, that the force of this logic was upheld not only by Israelis but also by Arab writers who, sticking to the “Big Lie,” alleged that the Liberty had been directing IAF strikes in Sinai and was only inadvertently attacked. Suleiman Mathhar, Annals of the June War Issue: Transcript of the Testimony before the Revolutionary Historical Commission (Cairo: Kitab al-Huriyya, 1990), pp. 86-88 [Arabic]; Muhammad El-Farra, Years of No Decision (London: KPI, 1987), pp. 58-68; Riad, Memoirs, p. 312; Heikal, The Explosion, pp. 731-732; Fawzi, The Three Years War, pp. 135-136. The claim also featured prominently in Egyptian radio broadcasts; see BBC World Service, Daily Report, Middle East, Africa and Western Europe B 8, June 16, 1967.

51. Details of the Israeli compensation payments can be found in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. lviii, no. 1512, June 17, 1968, and vol. lx, no. 1562, June 2, 1969, and U.S. Department of State Daily News Briefing, DPC 2451, December 18, 1980.

52. Congressman John Rhodes, a member of the House Appropriations Committee which investigated the Navy’s communications network in 1971, called the events surrounding the Liberty incident a “comedy of errors,” and then added: “Here we are, with the most sophisticated communications system ever known to mankind, and maybe it is so sophisticated we do not know how to operate it.” John J. Rhodes, Committee Hearing Report, p. 394, cited in Cristol, Liberty Incident, p. 98.

53. Friendly Fire Casualty Statistics on Southeast Asia, by Month at the American War Library Internet site.