So, while I think the author is correct in theory, it would seem that in practice PR in Israel has already done its dirty work and accomplished it effectively, which raises the interesting question of whether or not institutional reversibility of the kind that Amotz Asa-El has in mind is even possible. (Experience in France, where successive governments have tinkered with various forms of PR, has shown that the results are not encouraging.)

In sum, as a fact of political life, PR has fed differences, generated fringe extremist piety, and turned enough people off from politics altogether that the institutional change favored by the author is not in my view likely to have the desired effects—not until it is preceded by a more fundamental and realistic re-assessment of political values and practices. This would perhaps argue for something Israel has never to my knowledge really had—a constitutional review in a constituent assembly whose outcome would define the kind of state Israel wishes to become rather than what it is, and the content of which would be embodied in a written constitution. Only in this way can the issues of representation be articulated so their meanings become clear. But is such a constituent assembly even possible given present political differences and as well the pressure of outside enemies? Can a garrison state like Israel (which is so not by design but by force of circumstances) do much more than limp along from big crises to small ones and back again? Can it escape from a crisis politics that has become a thing in itself and which promotes opportunities for corruption and manipulation afforded by a politics of brinkmanship? So far, Israeli politics has succeeded in pulling rabbits out of the parliamentary hat. So far, no one has quite had the power to take Israel over the brink. So far, there has been a crucial pullback factor in Israeli political life—a form of Russian roulette in which one is never sure whether the bullet is blank or real. But this may also result in a politics of the last instance. How then to resolve the difficulties of such a political system? I wish I knew. And I also wish I knew enough about Israeli politics and society to even begin to offer constructive criticism.

David E. Apter
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

 

TO THE EDITORS:

The electoral reform proposed by Amotz Asa-El is necessary but unlikely to happen until Israel is blessed with a leader willing to risk his political life for the good of the country. Even if such a leader were to emerge, he would be well advised to follow the example of Charles de Gaulle.

The electoral system of the Third French Republic contributed to the country’s political instability and decline, which culminated in the humiliating collapse of June 1940. De Gaulle is said to have recalled with horror that president Roosevelt had told him in a meeting: “How can I take your country seriously when the name of its prime minister changes too often for me to keep track?” After the war, de Gaulle was determined to make France governable, but the political parties made his life impossible. He eventually slammed the door, mistakenly assuming that “the people” would beg him to come back. It took the Algerian War for de Gaulle’s wish to come true, after twelve years of exile in Colombey-les-Deux-glises. De Gaulle was able to establish a new political regime because he bypassed the corrupt and ineffective political establishment of the Fourth Republic (which was a mere continuation of the Third) with two referendums, one in 1958 for the adoption of a new constitution, and one in 1962 for the direct election of the president and the de facto establishment of a presidential regime. For an Israeli de Gaulle to bypass the Knesset, he would have to submit his electoral reforms directly to the people through referendums. But the Knesset will not pass a law allowing the use of referendum if it knows that the purpose of this law is to reform the electoral system (let alone establish a strong and stable executive branch). This is why the Knesset did not pass a referendum law in 2005: It feared that the Israeli electorate might reject Ariel Sharon’s plan to unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria. Now that the “disengagement” of 2005 is behind us and no major or dramatic decisions are in sight, submitting a referendum bill would not raise the Knesset’s suspicion and might therefore have a chance of being adopted. It is not enough to hope for a great leader to emerge. One has to lay the groundwork for such a leader to be able to bypass the Knesset and thoroughly reform Israel’s political system. Israeli lawmakers who understand the urgency of reforming our electoral system and who have the courage to take a political risk need to work toward the adoption of a referendum law while no major reforms or fateful decisions are on the table.

Emmanuel Navon
Tel Aviv University and the Institute for Policy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya

 

TO THE EDITORS:

Totten repeatedly stresses how much the Iraqi Kurds love the Americans. Yes, but. Although the United States indeed remains widely popular in the Kurdish Autonomous Region, it is with a background caveat, reminding all that the Kurds were betrayed twice before by the United States, in 1975 and 1991, and might be betrayed again. Indeed some Kurds began to fear the worst when The Iraq Study Group Report, released in December 2006, also suggested that the hard-won Kurdish federal state might have to be sacrificed to the perceived need for a re-established, centralized Iraqi state. Fortunately for the Kurds, the Baker-Hamilton recommendations failed to be adopted by the Bush administration. However, their mere consideration illustrated how tenuous future American support might be.

The Kurds have offered the United States a large, permanent military base in their territory because it would guarantee them protection from their hateful neighbors. Totten writes that such a base would offer the United States what it needs “without walking into the minefield of regional politics.” But would it really be in the long-term interest of the United States to have a colonial-type outpost surrounded by a huge, hostile majority in the Middle East? The United States should not let facile arguments about its supposed national interests and moral duties concerning the Kurdistan Regional Government deceive it into taking on a debilitating long-term commitment. It would be far better for the Kurdistan Regional Government to come to a permanent agreement with its neighbors Turkey and Iran through astute diplomacy and patience. The United States can play a useful role in helping to effect such an outcome by being patient and by understanding the needs and fears of all the involved parties.