As for the failure of Israeli female academics to take a stand in the Ben-Ari case that Kamir lambastes—I would say that it merely confirms my own analysis of the effects of a victimist ideology among those closest to its source.

Finally, Kamir’s rejection of Kadima party chairperson Tzipi Livni and others like her as “real” feminists is, sadly, all too telling. For Kamir, it seems, having obtained a powerful and influential role in society is not enough to earn one’s feminist credentials. Rather, women who have “made it” must serve as a mouthpiece for women’s issues, and pay consistent lip service to the oppression of their sisters. I, for one, reject such an approach to determining appropriate female role models. I hope that mainstream feminism will one day come instead to celebrate the achievements of those women who have demonstrated, by virtue of their actions and despite the many hurdles, what it is possible for the rest of us to achieve.

 

  

 To the Editors:

The Bush administration has left many victims in its wake. One of the most tragic is the policy of advancing democracy worldwide—a policy that emerged bruised and battered following the failures in Afghanistan and especially Iraq. The war there was justified and marketed as a struggle for the spread of democracy. According to President Bush and his neoconservative advisers, bringing down Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical regime would clear the way for the growth of an Arab democracy and, consequently, help begin the process of building a stable Middle East based on a democratic peace. But the Middle Eastern reality has left nothing of this optimistic vision. After a swift and impressive victory, American armed forces have sunk into a grueling, unremitting, and bloody struggle. The Iraqi democracy that was supposed to flourish under American auspices has remained nothing but an illusion. It cannot serve as an eye-opening example to neighboring countries. And so, instead of enjoying a democratic peace, the Middle East is sliding toward instability and nuclear proliferation.

Such an outcome will lead to a renewal of American isolationism. American political culture fosters two essentially contradictory beliefs about the role of the United States in the world, which exist alongside one another. The first is the ideal of advancing democracy worldwide, in the name of which the Bush government has led a crusade. The second is isolationism: the urge to withdraw behind the walls of “Fortress America” and ignore the outside world. The failure of Bush and his neoconservative advisers’ policy has weakened those who advocate the advancement of democracy, and may lead the American public and its political class to embrace a new isolationism. Amitai Etzioni’s eye-opening article (“A Right Above All Others,” Azure 33, Summer 2008) is a sincere and stimulating attempt to salvage something from the wreckage of the Bush presidency. As such, it is especially crucial in light of the new administration—although it is still too early to gauge President Obama’s intentions, or to evaluate his political abilities and qualifications. Moreover, the recently released National Intelligence Council report, which predicts the erosion of American hegemony, indicates that there is a critical need to rethink the foreign policy that the United States and its democratic allies should pursue.

Etzioni raises this issue, and states correctly that we must not abandon moral principles when formulating foreign policy. He is speaking mainly to the United States, but this is true of all democratic countries. It would be easy for the Western nations, which are licking the wounds inflicted by their military failures and dealing with the current economic crisis, to withdraw into themselves. But isolation has never been a moral or effective resolution to world crises. American isolationism is bound to create a leadership void, and one that will not remain empty for long. Other forces will rush to fill it, exploit the situation to their own advantage, and further destabilize the world. In the absence of global leadership, it will be difficult to coordinate international actions intended to ameliorate moral injustices and humanitarian disasters. One must admit that the international community’s record in this field is far from satisfactory. Moreover, American leadership is usually employed for the purpose of increasing economic exploitation worldwide, instead of relieving global poverty. Nevertheless, in the framework of the current world order, the United States has at least displayed leadership, other countries have shown their readiness to act in coordination with it, and the international community has been successful in alleviating the suffering of many victims around the world—albeit with alarming delay. To illustrate this point, one can mention, among others, the interventions in Haiti, Liberia, Kosovo, and East Timor. If the United States were to adopt an isolationist foreign policy, even these modest accomplishments would disappear.     

In the absence of American leadership, moreover, there would be no one to act against the hastening process of nuclear proliferation. On this point, Etzioni’s argument is crucial: The United States and other democratic countries must adopt a foreign policy that is guided by moral principles, first and foremost among them being the right to security and to life. Etzioni is right in saying, “when the right to security is violated, all other rights are threatened,” and in his claim that when security is guaranteed, public support for legal and political rights increases. It is self-evident that the destruction of life also nullifies the possibility of exercising one’s rights; and it is also reasonable to assume that the effective protection of life creates the foundation for an effective democracy. Etzioni is also correct that those who support a policy of aggressive democratization have reversed the proper order of things. Democracy does not necessarily ensure peace, but living in a state of peace does give democracy a chance. If this is so, then a policy that asserts life as “a right above all others” may also help bring stability to the world and straighten its moral backbone.

I would like, however, to point out a problem with this approach, although I admit that some may see my argument as a bit utopian and naןve. Etzioni accepts the current framework of international relations as a given, and as such believes it dictates the limits of our power to effect change. As he puts it, “As I see it, brutal international reality often requires following what might be called a ‘second-worst’ course to avoid having to negotiate the worst one.” I do not deny that the reality of international relations is indeed cruel from time to time. Unfortunately, this is quite often the case. But the limits this reality imposes on us are not necessarily as harsh as Etzioni assumes, especially if we consider other, non-state actors on the international scene.

It is true that the sovereign states are currently the central and most powerful players in global affairs. It is also true that the United States, the focus of Etzioni’s article, is the most powerful of all the sovereign states, and is currently the only superpower in the world. Etzioni’s assumptions about the limits imposed on American power are quite reasonable. At the moment, the United States cannot unilaterally pursue a policy of democratization and, at the same time, a policy of ensuring security and stability. America must also consider the limits of power when it collaborates with its allies. Sovereignty, legality, legitimacy, and the various norms and institutions that allow a state to maneuver in the international arena also limit it to specific courses of action. All of these factors shape the behavior of the state as an international legal personality that has rights and is subjected to restrictions. In addition, a state’s legitimate focus on securing and promoting its own national interests further limits its freedom of action. In other words, the source of a state’s power (including that of the United States) in the global arena is also its weakest point when it comes to humanitarian acts and the promotion of democracy. This weakness is the strongest justification for Etzioni’s argument that life is “a right above all others.” If the capabilities of the sovereign state are indeed limited, there is no way to avoid ranking different goals and prioritizing actions. Such a policy, one that considers moral principles as well as practical limitations, leads almost inevitably to an approach that deems life “a right above all others.”

What would happen, however, if we expanded our analysis beyond the sovereign state to include other types of actors—such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational social movements, and influential private individuals and public figures? The influence of all these non-state actors is increasing. Indeed, we must not forget that the terror organizations against which the United States is leading an all-out war are also transnational social movements. This detrimental influence on international affairs could be countered by movements with a positive agenda—such as promoting human rights and democracy around the world. These organizations already exist in great numbers, and occasionally operate with the indirect assistance of democratic governments; they include the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, Amnesty International, Oxfam, Freedom House, Transparency International, and others. To this list, we can add the European Union, which has features of both the state and the non-state actor. In addition, there are certain honorable private individuals who are influential on the international scene, such as Jimmy Carter, Nelson Mandela, Elie Wiesel, the Dalai Lama, and many other good people. While countries can easily communicate with other countries—that is, government institutions can easily communicate with other government institutions—non-governmental organizations and individuals can act together on the level of civil society. In other words, the global civil society—or its offshoots—can influence domestic civil societies.

So a global civil society can promote democratic civil societies in individual countries while states ensure security and the right to life. In other words, alongside the principle of life as “a right above all others,” we can also act on the principle of democracy as “a right for all others”—democracy in the sense of an appropriate political order that assures human rights, acceptable norms of cooperation and justice, and the political order to which all those who demand it are entitled. There are many around the world who are demanding it, including in dictatorial countries. It is enough to mention the recent mass demonstrations—and their suppression—in Myanmar and Thailand, as well as the political activists who risk their freedom and their lives in Russia, Iran, and China. It is possible, I believe, for the United States and its allies to protect the worthy cause of life as “a right above all others,” and simultaneously support a global civil society and its efforts for the sake of democracy.

When one considers the possibility of this global civil society and its potential, it becomes clear that democracy should not be promoted in a unilateral, militarily aggressive way, as the neoconservatives and the Bush administration tried to do. The cause of democracy can be promoted only by a multi-faceted strategy, careful dialogue, and winning the hearts and minds of other people. A global democratization campaign cannot be satisfied with building democratic institutions through local elites, who are generally more than glad to cynically exploit the first stages of the process in order to legitimize and ensure their power—see, for instance, the case of Russian leader Vladimir Putin. Such a project should instead promote democratic values and norms, and their internalization by the citizenry through democratic education and the cultivation of local agents of democracy—quite unlike the failed neoconservative approach. There is, of course, no guarantee that such efforts will be successful, but the principle of life as “a right above all others” does not prevent us from advocating “democracy for all others” through these new actors on the global stage. This is not merely an advisable course of action, but also a moral obligation.

Piki Ish-Shalom
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

 

Amitai Etzioni Responds:

Piki Ish-Shalom’s points are well taken. There is indeed no reason to settle for the international system as it is, and we do have a moral obligation to try and transform it into what it ought to be. I also agree that promoting human rights and democracy by non-violent means—such as public education and visits by luminaries and political leaders—and the further development of the nascent global civil society can aid such progress. Nevertheless, given that what must be done is extensive and resources are decidedly limited, the issue of setting priorities looms very large indeed.

I must, therefore, return to my thesis that our first priority must be to stop killing, maiming, and torture in places such as, for example, the Congo and Sudan; to prevent terrorist attacks; and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction wherever possible. This is essential for two reasons: Saving lives is an even higher moral good than promoting freedom; and without ensuring basic security, freedom does not have a prayer.